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ABSTRACT
The borderline territory serves a double purpose, being simultaneously 
zones of cultural contact and cultural barriers—administrative and 
often civilizational. This ambivalence frequently affects borderline area 
inhabitants turning them into hostages of border management regimes 
and outside projections concerning their cultural and civilizational 
status, and the authenticity of forms of their culture representation. In the 
case of Birobidzhan, we are dealing with an absolutely modern project 
of creating ethnic territoriality without reference to the historical context 
and far from the places of traditional settlement of the Jewish population. 
The implementation of this project put the Jewish settlers at the center 
of a complex process of border management and securitization of 
the border areas. The factors of border and “remoteness” are largely 
underestimated in Birobidzhan studies. The article fills this niche, 
emphasizing the spatial aspects of the implementation of the “anti-
Zionist utopia” and its complex relationship with previous models of 
territoriality in the region and local inhabitants.
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Birobidzhan is undoubtedly one of the most unusual cities in the Far East of 
Russia. A tourist visiting the Jewish Autonomous Region1 will be surprised to see 
symbolic traces of the Jewish presence, Yiddish inscriptions and monuments to 
Jewish writers. Cultural policy in the region plays freely with its Jewish past, often 
reinventing it and creating the appearance of an intense revival of Jewish culture 
(Maksimowska, 2009). Over time, it will inevitably see the slightly phantom character 
of Russia’s most Jewish city. Most residents have very conditional ties with Jewish 
culture, do not use Yiddish in their daily lives, and perceive Jewish scenery as 
regional specifics. Despite the mass exodus of Jews after 1991, the region continues 
to reproduce its special status and preserve its unique history. In this perspective, 
the rare enthusiasm for Birobidjan and the frequent criticism in the categories of 
inconsistency reflect the ambivalent nature of the place that could not become a full-
fledged republic for Jews, but cannot stop being one, constantly re-inventing its past. 
The vast literature devoted to the trajectories of the Jewish resettlement project 
in the Far East has left aside the spatial aspects of the project (Dekel-Chen, 2007; 
Estraikh, 2019; Gurevich, 2020; Weinberg, 1998). By adopting the “empty territory” 
postulate, the researchers ignored the project’s border localization and its deep 
ties to the tsarist and Soviet border regimes. Studies of the borders of Inner Asia 
(Peshkov, 2012) provide an opportunity to fill this gap by presenting the essential 
role of the border regime for all stages of the project’s existence. Localization in 
the border zone has largely determined the main factors of its development. The 
securitization of the border areas turned the region into a semi-empty territory, the 
irrevocable closure of the border increased remoteness, and the culture of border 
mobilization2 made it possible to manifest state anti-Semitism in the most aggressive 
form not found in other areas of the USSR.
This perspective will help us to look at the creation of Jewish settlements in 
the Far East from an unexpected angle, showing the complex relationship of the 
new formation of immigrants with alternative models of territoriality in the region. 
An equally important task of the article is to de-colonize (Tlostanova, 2008) the 
dominant perspective of the Birobidzhan project research, in which the colonial 
categories of empty land, useless territory, natives, and comical distance from the 
center are accepted as legitimate descriptions of reality. All the classic features of 
the colonization project (the absence of historical roots, remoteness from places 
of compact residence, the desire to occupy empty space, the invisibility of local 
residents) (Balandier, 2010) in the descriptions of Birobidzhan appear as a heavy 
1 The ambitious and world-known Soviet Project of Jewish Autonomous Region (JAR) in the Far 
East was established in 1934. The main city and symbol of the project was Birobidzhan, wich was founded 
in 1928 based on the railway station called Tikhonkaya. Birobidzhan was Evenks’ name (Бира бид(ж)енэ), 
and meant a nomad camp at the Bira River. The Project of JAR resulted from searching a pattern of Jewish 
autonomy in Soviet Union, which linked the elements of Zionism, Soviet model of national autonomy and 
socialist ideas of secular Jewish settler state and secular Jewish culture. The Soviet propaganda used the 
slogan “To the Jewish Homeland” to inspire Jewish workers from USSR, Europe, South and North America 
to participate in development of new socialist Jewish Land. For many reasons (hard leaving conditions, 
repressions, bad logistics and paranoia against international supporters) mass migration was stopped.
2 Special cultural policy aimed at permanent emotional inclusion the border population in the 
defense of the boundary.
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challenge to fate or even as punishment from the state. This shows that the colonial 
roots of the project have never been questioned and are still automatically transferred 
to scientific discourses. 
The tragic history of the Jewish migration (Gessen, 2016) does not exclude 
Birobidzhan from the colonial archive of the Far East. The very situation when 
participants of the previous colonial project are destroyed or discriminated in the 
frame of a new model is typical for both Russian and Soviet models of frontier 
management. The role of the border management regime is key here: each change 
has led to the marginalization of some communities and the temporary ascent of 
others. The Russian border in the region was largely based on Cossack settlements; 
the Soviet regime of border management leads to disappearance of the Cossacks; 
the Jewish population is rapidly dissolving in the flow of new immigrants; and the 
post-Soviet model of the open border marginalizes the former residents of the 
border regions, leaving them without jobs and clear life priorities. Moreover, a slight 
weakening of the exclusivity of the Jewish project and its inclusion in the general 
logic of the cultural and administrative development of the region will allow a broader 
view on the problems of the past and present of the region. In this perspective, the 
inclusion of “colonialism of the weak” in the new imperial history of the region is a 
challenge both for historians of the region and for comparative studies of Jewish 
migrations. The localization of the Jewish project in the colonial archive of the Far 
East will provide an opportunity to show the tragedy of Birobidzhan in a broader 
perspective of the tension between the practices of national zoning, securitization of 
borders and the search for models for development of remote regions.
Border and Colonialism: from Russian to Soviet Version
The assumption of the target ethnic, confession and political coherence of the 
borderland area is crucial for the Russian (Tsarist) and Chinese (Qing) colonial 
experience in Asia, which based on agrarian use of nomadic frontier land and 
re-orientation of indigenous nomadic population towards colonial Centers by 
controlling the transborder movement, the separation of religious institutions from 
the authorities outside borders, state support for migration and active militarization of 
indigenous population. But these policies included the nomadic communities in new 
forms of modernity. The railways, airplanes and motor vehicles not only connected 
areas remote from the centers with national geography of industrial development, 
but also manifested the state’s ability of modernization. The external modernity 
(in late imperial, nationalist and socialist versions) was manifested as complex 
of discourses and practices oriented toward the transition remoteness areas in 
coherent part of national body. The strong competition in Inner Asia between Russia/
USSR, China and Japan has a strong connection to spectacles of great logistic and 
industrial projects. This fighting with “backwardness” and “remoteness” created the 
new forms of temporality and spatiality, which transformed the today “remoteness 
and backwardness” into space of development strictly connected with national 
economy. In the Far East case, the “coherence” in borderland was understood as a 
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Russia-oriented agro-nomadic space with the essential role of military institutions 
(Cossacks) and cultural domination of Orthodox communities (Peshkov, 2012).
With the victory of the Bolsheviks in the civil war, the situation changed in border 
areas to model of border-bastion. The center orientation and closed character of the 
Soviet space turned borderline areas into half-empty places remaining in absolute 
readiness for confrontation. Frontier forms of socialism were special not only because 
of the extremely intense implementation of Soviet methods of modernization, but also 
because they reached a particularly high level of political and social sterility of frontier 
population (Peshkov, 2014). According to the Soviet outlook on the world, borders 
were viewed as a source of danger and an area of confrontation with the enemies. The 
fact that the neighboring countries were political opponents of the USSR legitimized 
militarization of borderline regions and limitlessly fueled the civil war atmosphere. 
The model of frontier socialism was characterized by closed-border policy, special 
attention from state authorities to the supervision of border communities (special 
rights, movement control, the propagandist idea of a border as a bastion, etc.), and a 
very strong connection between socialist modernization and militarization of the 
area (on the economic, cultural and social levels). 
Mass migration from the Centre together with the spread of primary education 
in socialist schools had the effect of marginalizing the hybrid culture of the border 
regions and sharply accentuating the cultural distance between the Russian and 
Chinese sides of the border. The incoming new populations began to dominate, 
bringing with them an absolutely different geographical imagination and gradually 
creating new forms of identity. The socialist conceptualization of a border (as 
a limitation of legal space and separation from the outside world) legitimized the 
military style of governing and the special attention paid to the governing of economic 
activity. The experience of the socialist border was in many ways re-formed, not 
only as regards its present but also as understandings of the past (Peshkov, 2018). 
Both theoretically and historically, borders have never been fixed categories and 
the ways of their conceptualization and location have varied depending on time 
and space. Border conceptualization constitutes an integral part of society’s 
identity determining the processes and rituals of its integration to a considerable 
extent. State versions of history are also strongly determined by processes of 
borders defense and legitimization. In the Far East case, the main categories of 
border imagination were “waste areas” (waiting for colonizers) and quasi-invisible 
indigenous population (waiting for gift of Modernity). This led to amnesia and years 
of blindness to the region’s pre-colonial past.
Who is the Owner of the “Waste Land”? Production of the Invisible 
A common feature of all settler states is the involuntary nature of relocation and 
the transformation of a new place into own territory (Cooper, 2010). Locals in this 
perspective become “victims of victims”, turning into an obstacle on the way of progress 
or becoming an exotic scenery for tourists. In this perspective, the case of Birobidzhan 
is special, being a classic example of the settler formation (two waves of refugees 
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from anti-Semitism); it simultaneously becomes a hostage of ethnic status and almost 
immediately turns into a subaltern settler formation. The specificity of this situation is 
the constant politicization of the Jewish question (ties with foreign countries, Zionism, 
cosmopolitanism, sympathy for Israel), which turns Birobidzhan into a trap for the 
remaining Jews (Gurevich, 2020). This type of formation (especially after the World 
War II) creatively combines the colonial status of the owners of the territory with the 
“forbidden life”3. The irony of the situation is that the Birobidzhan migrants practically 
did not enjoy privileges and, if possible, helped discriminated groups4. Nevertheless, 
this “human-faced colonialism” had all the features of a colonial situation: the empty 
space waiting for Jewish settlers long before they arrived was stripped of its past and 
the locals became the setting for a new project. This explains the situation that, despite 
the contradictory policy of the Center towards Jews, it is the Jewish identity that is 
reproduced in the Soviet conditions. Other stories and identities were simply erased.
The answer to the question who originally was the owner of the territory of today’s 
Jewish Autonomous Region is quite complex. It should be noted that this place is 
a reservoir of failed colonization projects. As an integral part of the Manchu lands, 
it was annexed under the Treaty of Aigun (1858) and the Beijing Convention (1860). 
This acquisition leads to a sharp outflow of the population and disruption of economic 
ties. Most of the Manchu and Chinese leave the territory. Only the Evenki [Evenks], 
who retain their cross-border status, stay.
The place of the Chinese and the Manchus should be taken by the resettled 
parts of the Transbaikalian Cossacks, but weak organization and ill-conceived 
infrastructure leads to the failure of the project. The Cossacks’ standard of 
living is rapidly falling; the area becomes a symbol of difficult life conditions and 
backwardness. At the same time, the flow of Korean refugees reaches the region 
and the number of the Koreans is rapidly increasing. 
Together with the October Revolution (1917), the question of the status of the 
territory becomes much more complicated. Chinese leaders take both treaties as 
unequal, seeing the region as lost territories. Significant part of the Cossacks and 
Koreans support the Far Eastern Republic (1920–22) and see the future of the region 
in the framework of a moderate socialist project in alliance with Russia (Sablin, 2020). 
Even more of the Cossacks join ataman Semyonov5 and hope for the inclusion of 
3 After the World War II, the USSR rapidly changed its policy towards Jews. From a country where 
the Jewish population enjoyed all rights and was even the object of an affirmative policy, the USSR is 
shifting towards state anti-Semitism (hidden behind slogans about the friendship of peoples), reinforced in 
the 60s by anti-Israeli policy. This situation turns the JAR into a trap, the only Jewish unit in the USSR must 
survive the full burden of responsibility for Zionism.
4 The relations between former Cossacks and Jewish immigrants largely destroy the stereotype of 
a constant conflict between the two groups. After the negative and tragic experience of the civil war, Jewish 
immigrants were surprised to discover the Cossack subculture without anti-Semitic agenda. Mutual support 
and mixed marriages have led to the emergence of subcultures and biographies impossible for other regions.
5 Grigory Mikhailovich Semyonov (b. September 13(26), 1896, d. August 30, 1946) was a leader 
and a controversial symbol of the anti-communist Transbaikalian Cossack uprising. After the collapse of 
the White Movement, he was forced to abandon Far East in September 1921. After the Red Army entered 
Manchuria, he was captured and executed, following a long investigation. The Soviet propaganda connected 
him to all forms of resistance against the communists in Transbaikalia, Mongolia and Inner Mongolia.
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the region in his political projects, and after emigration—in the Japanese plans to 
create a frontier state under the Japanese protectorate. Due to the small number of 
indigenous people, they hardly participate in political processes, continuing to use 
the forest as a cross-border zone, where they have always been the masters. In this 
perspective, the history of the region is a cascade of exceptions, subject to changes in 
the border regime. Each subsequent change leads to the crossing out of the previous 
state and the effect of an empty land, where everything starts over. Except the Evenks, 
all other participants of this process perceive the region as a place of potential 
development or preservation, without much regard for local conditions. The Manchus 
see it as a protected area, preserving sacred places and real customs (Di Cosmo, 
1998)—here the related Evenks turn into guardians of the Manchu power. For Russian 
administration—it is as an empty space that needs to be populated by Cossacks and 
peasants. For the government of the Far Eastern Republic, it is a forlorn corner which 
needs rapid modernization. And for the Far Eastern atamans—these are the Cossack 
lands in need of support. 
This combination of orientation towards future and the impossibility of 
fundamental changes in the present has largely determined the trajectory of projects 
in the region. In addition to objective factors (weak infrastructure, long distance 
from the centers, limited opportunities for international exchange and insufficient 
population), the peripheral nature of regional development projects for China and 
Russia, and to a lesser extent for the USSR, played a huge role. In this perspective, 
the history of the region resembles the myth of the colonial Sisyphus. Endless 
efforts are drowned in new projects, participants of previous projects disappear, the 
memory of the past is very sparingly recorded by the local museum. This colonial 
present was created long before the October Revolution by the joint efforts of the 
Manchu and Tsarist administrations. The main difference between the Chinese and 
Russian projects is the attitude towards the indigenous peoples of the region.
The modern history of Evenks is related directly to the Sino-Russian border 
management in Inner Asia. The Russian conquest of the Transbaikalian region 
resulted in a long-term migration of Tungus tribes to the south (Hulunbuir in China) or 
north (Yakutiya in Russia). The transborder character of the nation has resulted in the 
clash of two official versions of Evenks culture and the dependence of official historical 
discourses about Evenks’ origin on Sino-Russian relations. In this context, the Evenks 
indigenousness has a very modern origin since it resulted from Russian and Chinese 
border management. Imperial cultures see the history of a small transborder nation 
differently. From the Chinese point of view, Evenks are included in the state historical 
narrative by “Evenkizing” the archaeological artifacts of the region and emphasizing 
the role of the Evenks in the history of the Northern China. The ambivalent nature of 
the nation’s image gives the possibility of a specific “division of labor”: the northern 
Evenks symbolizes the authentic culture; the history of southern Evenki symbolizes 
the nation’s contribution to defending China’s frontiers against Russian Expansion. 
The Russian version defines the Evenks as a people exposed to danger 
stemming from their backwardness and the resulting lack of preparation for living 
in the contemporary world. Both the state and the society position themselves 
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paternalistically as guardians of confused and vanishing nomads. Such perspective 
is deeply rooted in Russian culture and has resulted in an interesting combination 
of sentimental sympathy over the poor Tungus’ fate and absolute indifference as 
regards constant and prolonged practices of controlling Evenks’ agency through 
territorial barriers, inconsistent state development policy and disintegration of week 
ethnopolitical institutions. The Evenks stereotype in Russian culture has been 
shaped by post-Soviet museums and local cultural projects emphasizing permanent 
“traditionality” of indigenous cultures. Museum exhibitions and generally available 
information show the Evenks from an external viewpoint of an educated European 
viewer who is supposed to admire the legacy of old cultures. The sentimental image 
of the noble Tungus in Russian culture, which requires protection from modernity 
and Chinese merchants, with all its warmth only strengthens the idea of “people of 
nature” who do not need to be asked for permission to use their land. Any contact with 
civilization is a blessing in this perspective, and they should be grateful to visitors for 
a chance to be developed. This exotic image of a peripheral community completely 
excluded them from the political agenda and the status of the owners of the territory.
Since the Birobidzhanians have already developed the de-Evenkized territory, 
the Evenks are perceived as a distant exotic. Except for a few traditional costumes 
in the local museum and some statistics from pre-WWII reports, the region literally 
does not see the Evenks past of the territory. If the former Cossacks have become 
invisible to the State, but not to the Jewish residents of Birobidzhan, the Evenks, 
while remaining a recognized subject of state policy, continued to be invisible to 
the community. When I asked about the indigenous inhabitants of the region, local 
historians replied that there were few natives and they did not know anything about 
them. People spoke warmly about Evenks, but with protectionist notes (using the 
colonial term tuzemtsy [natives]), having no idea about their life and culture.
The destructive effects of state modernistic strategies towards communities 
defined as backward were clearly showed in development studies (Peshkov, 2004). 
The compulsory choice of the modernity instead of the autonomy allows the state to 
exclude the so-called “backward communities” from the legal boundaries in order to 
implement randomly established “absolute right” of communities to modern models 
of life (Scott, 1998). This biopolitical perspective situated state in its ability to call for 
a state of exception and a temporary suspension of rights. The radical expansion of 
a legal boundaries connected with transition to modern models of economic activity 
can be combined with simultaneous turning of the economic, cultural and social 
rights within paternalistic logic of development. The possibility to stop the economic, 
social and cultural rights in order to fight against “backwardness” shows not only their 
contextual nature, but also the priority of the state’s right to biopolitical sovereignty. 
Common for all forced modernization projects was the imperative of linear movement 
from backwardness to development. In this context, the traditional culture of the 
communities was perceived as an obstacle to development and the main source of 
economic backwardness.
The idea of an empty space is not neutral and carries an unambiguous political 
declaration: only inclusion in modern life brings indigenous peoples out of the state 
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of savagery and gives them rights. Until this happens, they are perceived as part of 
nature, not directly related to large processes. In addition, empty lands are designated 
as cleared of indigenous peoples. All participants in the modernization attempts 
(except the Manchus) perceived and continue to perceive the indigenous people 
as wild people of the forest, related more to nature than to politics. The Birobidzhan 
case is very important for colonial research. In this situation, the “invisibility” of local 
residents is not directly related to either mass migration or the urbanization of the 
region. This once again shows the strength of the cultural formations of colonialism 
and their ability to produce negative effects, even if the colonial project fails.
The second group of “invisibles” is the “old settlers” communities of the region. 
The appearance of Russians in Inner Asia resulted in the development of new forms 
of ethnic and cultural identity based on cultural syncretism and miscegenation of the 
members of the analyzed groups with the inhabitants of the region. These mixed 
communities need to keep the balance between Russian culture and the elements 
of the indigenous one. The specificity of Eastern Transbaikalia as regards most 
part of its population was the overlapping of the quasi-indigenous status and the 
Cossack estate. After 1858, Transbaikalian Cossacks was replaced to Amur River. 
After the end of Civil War, the hostile attitude of the communist authorities to the 
Cossacks (raskazachivaniye [decossackization], raskulachivanie [dispossession] and 
deportations), and the new socialist border regime provoked radical ethnic and social 
changes in the area. In that context, active border cleansing policy finally isolated the 
new Soviet Far East from old social and cultural structures. 
The first three decades of the new system were particularly traumatic for 
the analyzed groups. Their mass migration to China began in 1918 and initially it 
concerned only richer Cossacks escaping to avoid decossackization practices. 
A large percentage of Cossacks in the first immigration wave established the models 
for perceiving migrants to borderline territories for a long time (they were perceived 
according to their origin and political views). Soviet propaganda for many years 
defined both countries of exile as places of refuge of politically active White Cossack 
emigrants. We are dealing with a special situation here, i.e., mixed ethnic groups 
favored by the previous colonial system became the victims of both organized and 
unorganized violence despite the simultaneous activation of the new ethnic and racial 
order (Peshkov, 2012). Mixed communities that originated as a result of one colonial 
and modernizing project were consciously and systematically eliminated after the 
introduction of another.
Utopia and Settler State: Far Eastern Version
The Soviet proclamation of the Jewish Autonomous Region in the Far East was a 
historic event not only for the region, but also for the whole world (Kuchenbecker, 
2000). The young Soviet state proclaimed the first Jewish ethno-political structure 
with its own territory, its own administration and cultural policy (Gitelman, 1988). 
This communist response to the Zionists has stirred up the Jews all over the world 
(Kotlerman, 2009). Despite its modest status as an “autonomous region about to 
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become a republic,” Birobidzhan was an exclusive Soviet project. From the point 
of view of external observers, it was a state within a state: its international status 
and the historical experiment in the transition of the Jews to agriculture made it a 
real alternative to Palestine and projects of non-territorial autonomy (Patek, 2007). 
It is important to pay attention to the performative aspects of the proclamation—a 
remote area, not affected by urbanization, becomes a place of international effort 
and an important factor in international politics. Creatively combining the national 
and the class (Maksimowska, 2009), it was open to Jewish youth from everywhere 
and for a surprisingly long time (by Soviet standards) received technical and financial 
assistance from all over the world. The Soviet project of Jewish autonomy was to 
combine Jewish dreams of their own land with the demands of a new society: Jewish 
culture was to become modern, proletarian, and secular. The language of autonomy 
becomes Yiddish (Estraikh, 1999), the main branch of Jewish agriculture, the station 
Tikhonkaya turns into a town Birobidzhan (1937) with a rich theatrical and literary life. 
The combination of two utopias (national and communist) from the very beginning 
determined the specifics of the new life. The absence of Jewish history in the region 
freed up the imagination and possibilities for cultural experimentation. If the old life 
remains in the Pale of settlement, then the new life can be represented in any way. 
Hebrew was distrusted as the language of obscurantism and reaction, and religion 
was rejected as unnecessary for a new life. In this perspective, the paradoxes were 
written into the Birobidzhan project from the very beginning (Kotlerman & Yavin, 
2007). Birobidzhan was anything but a shtetl. The mass fascination with agriculture, 
the absence of synagogues and Jewish entrepreneurs became a way of new life and 
preparation for communism on their land.
The two utopias listed above were in a complex relationship throughout the 
history of Soviet Birobidzhan, and at some point, the national one had to submit 
completely to the requirements of the party conjuncture. The disaster of the 
project was due not only to the lack of conditions to accept most of the Jews of the 
USSR, but also to the growing suspicion towards Jews from the government after 
1945. Birobidzhan suddenly becomes a place of persecution of Jews: people are 
persecuted for using Yiddish in teaching, literature or theater (Gurevich, 2020). The 
culmination is the public burning of Jewish books in the main square of the city—
despite the Holocaust, being a Jew becomes suspicious for the Soviet state and 
society. This transition from a state of affirmative action towards Jews to a semi-
official state anti-Semitism was matched by the evolution of the project from a Soviet 
promised land to a territorial trap seized by a dangerous name and a wariness of 
everything Jewish (Gurevich, 2020). The influx of new Jewish population stops, 
but the region retains part of the cultural infrastructure and constantly balances 
between the culture of working Jewry and Zionism. Despite a very controversial 
policy, the post- WWII years were a period of rapid growth of the quality of life. Until 
the end of the Soviet Union, the state remained suspicious of Jews, reinforced by 
the remoteness and dominance of military institutions. The region almost did not 
notice perestroika, continuing to catch the Zionists and anxiously testing itself for 
loyalty to a large country.
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In this perspective, the proclamation of Jewish Autonomous Region was an 
attempt to build its own territory within the USSR and permanently erase the history 
of Jewish exile6. The failure of this project does not negate its role in the history 
of Jewish colonization. Consciously or unconsciously mixing Zionist aesthetics 
with Soviet optimism, the region had to create a new person capable of forcing 
the harsh taiga to retreat and conquering the earth for a new life (Gurevich, 2020). 
Unlike Palestine, the Far Eastern project was not balanced by the idea of returning 
to native land. The land was given by the Soviet state, which made the entire project 
defenseless against changes in the Soviet political course. The gift of the Soviet 
state demanded reciprocity and gradually turned the owners of the territory into 
semi-invisible beings.
The example of Birobidzhan can tell us a lot about the problems of the settler 
society with the justification of its presence as the owners of the land. When historical 
arguments do not work, and the places of compact settlement are thousands of 
kilometers away, the performative aspects of the act of proclamation become the 
main one. It can be assumed that, as in the case of other Soviet ethno-political 
structures, the center and the region read the same declarations differently. The 
very localization in the “Soviet Brotherhood of Nations” made any national project 
completely dependent on the will of the center and its changeable approaches 
to the national question. Here the situation is complicated by the very position of 
the new formation—dependent on international aid, populated by a large number 
of foreigners and separated from cultural centers, the region was from the very 
beginning a foreign body in the system of managing national issues. The example of 
Birobidzhan provides an opportunity to take a fresh look at the Soviet national policy 
and its consequences. There are no final winners and losers, cultural dominance 
in the region does not mean security; any form of strengthening of ethno-political 
structures raises suspicions of disloyalty and nationalism. In this perspective, local 
nationalisms were subject to constant control and discipline, which gave rise to the 
effect of an unfulfilled desire in the republics.
This largely explains the spread of affective forms of nationalism after the 
collapse of the USSR. No less important is the example of the Jewish Autonomous 
Region in understanding the difficult combination of Soviet forms of colonialism with 
the proclamation of the equality of nations and the renunciation of the “dark tsarist 
past”. All the communities that the migrants met became invisible or disenfranchised. 
The Cossacks were repressed as White Guards and spies, the Chinese and Koreans 
were deported, the Evenks were practically not included in the process of developing 
the region. Regardless of the status of “a former” or “invisible” person, the population 
of the border region was subjected to forced marginalization and deprivation of 
rights (Feferman & Epstein, 2010). We can talk here about the trap of a migrant in 
projects subordinated to external management: agreeing to the arbitral elimination of 
the rights to land of previous residents—he remains one-on-one with the state. The 
migrants themselves will quickly turn into phantom subjects, subjected to a severe 
test and to the expectation of atonement for the Soviet society.
6 Performative effects of declaration (see: Derrida, 1984/1986).
230 Ivan Peshkov
Conclusion
Studies of the past and present of the Jewish Autonomous Region considered the 
project of resettlement of the Jewish population to the Far East in several overlapping 
perspectives: the reasons for the resettlement, its dynamics and scale, repression 
and the policy of state anti-Semitism after 1945, the impact of the confrontation with 
Israel and the problems of preserving and inventing Jewish culture in the region. In 
addition, a fairly large archive of memories was collected, revealing to us all the 
contradictions of the “Promised Land” in the USSR. Much less attention was paid 
to the spatial aspects of the Jewish colonization project—its relation to previous 
models of colonization, the local population, the Soviet security policy of border 
territories and relation to the imperial and Soviet models of colonial development of 
the periphery.
The proposed attempt to show a broader perspective of the resettlement 
project provides an opportunity to take a fresh look at the Russian model of 
presence in Inner Asia. The experience of the Jewish Autonomous Region shows 
that a colonial cultural formation can exist without the use of violence and even with 
a certain sympathy for the local population. The rejection of one-sided prospects for 
overcoming the backwardness of the region (where yesterday’s owners of the territory 
turn into an obstacle to development) can be a step towards the decolonization 
of consciousness and the revision of the colonial experience of the region. In this 
context, decolonization means, first of all, the rejection of the rationalization of 
repressive policies, finding of a balance in relations with indigenous peoples, and 
the rejection of the idea of the region as a white sheet on which a migrant from 
Eastern Europe writes his history.
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